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Conditional pricing practices-including bundled

about where things may head in coming years. I

discounting, loyalty rebating, and market share

have been a partisan rather than detached observ

discounts-are not new phenomena in the U.S.

er in these engagements-representing clients in

market. Their potentially exclusionary conse

litigation and writing a number of scholarly papers

quences were raised in antitrust cases decades

on the topic, generally in opposition to intrusive

ago.1 But unlike tying or exclusive dealing-which

antitrust scrutiny of loyalty-enhancing pricing

have a rich history of case law and scholarly cover

practices.4 For purposes of this essay, however, it

age-conditional pricing practices did not emerge

is not my goal to make the case in favor of condi

as salient to the antitrust community until a little

tional pricing or antitrust restraint, but rather to

over a decade ago. Two federal appellate decisions

provide a descriptive overview of the continuing

in the early 2ooos-Concord Boat2 on market share

course of this debate in the United States.

rebates and LePage's3 on bundled discounting
sparked a period of intensive interest and activity
on these topics in the antitrust agencies, courts,
bench, and legal and economic academy. Because
the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet weighed in
(and may not do so in the near future given the
smal I number of antitrust cases it hears), the
issues are largely in the hands of the lower fed
eral courts and antitrust agencies, where there is
nothing approaching consensus on how to apply
Section 2 of the Sherman Act to conditional pricing
practices.
In this essay, I propose to provide a high level
reflection on the development of the condition
al pricing issue over the last decade in the U.S.,
articulate the current state of play, and speculate

Finding the Analogue: Disguised Preda
tion or Something Else?
Federal antitrust law has long been understood
to be essentially a common law process,5 and the
heart of common law reasoning is analogy. It is
therefore unsurprising that American lawyers have
tended to approach conditional pricing-an area
without strong legal precedent-by asking "what
known practice is this like?" Of course, analogies
are always imperfect (otherwise the analogues
would be the same thing) so, assuming that a close
analogy to conditional pricing is detected, the
question then is whether the rules governing that
practice can be imported wholesale or whether
they should be modified in some manner.

See, e.g., SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly&Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.1978)

1

4

See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining Over Loyalty, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 253

law for exclusion through bundled discounts).

(2013); Can Bundled Discounts Raise Prices Withour Excluding Rivals?,

Concord Boat v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (81h Cir. 2000) (reject

5

Comp. Pol. lnt'I (Oct. 2009); Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Con
sumer Welfare, 54 Emory L. J. 423 (2006); Multiproduct Discounting.
A Myrh of Non-Price Predarion, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 27 (2005)
See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Separarion of Powers, Prosecurorial Discre

(finding pharmaceutical company liable under monopolization
2

ing claim of boat manufacturers that stern drive engine manufac
turer suppressed competition through market share discounts).
3

LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en bane) (affirming
jury verdict in favor of transparent tape manufacturer claiming

tion, and the "Common Law" Narure ofAntirrusr Law. 60 Tex. L. Rev.

that diversified rival harmed competition through use of bundled

661, 663 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50

discounts)

Rev. 533, 544 (1983).
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The two early cases of the current era of focusing

seller of private label transparent tape, with sales

on conditional pricing came to opposite con

approaching 90% of that market sub-segment

clusions on the analogy question. Much of the

LePage's sued3M for monopolizing the transpar

contestation over the legal treatment of condi

ent tape market by offering retailers multi-tiered

tional pricing sinee that time can be understood

bundled discounts contingent upon purchases

as playing in_ the shadows cast by those two early

across multiple 3M product lines, including Health

cases-Concord Boat and LePage's.

Care Products, Home Care Products, Home Im
provement Products, Stationery Products (includ

Concord Boat involved allegations by a number of

ing transparent tape) , Retai I Auto Products, and

boat manufacturers that Brunswick, the leading

Leisure Time.

maker of inboard and stern drive marine engines
with a market share between so% and 7S% de

Unlike the Concord Boat court, the U.S. Court of Ap

pending on the year, monopolized the boat engine

peals for the Third Circuit rejected3M's argument

market through market share discounts. Between

that its bundled discounts could not be unlawful

1984 and 1997, Brunswick offered three tiers of

unless they resulted in below-cost pricing. The

first-dollar discounts-generally1o/o, Zo/o, Or3o/o,

court interpreted the Supreme Court's predato-

but in some years as high as so/a-to customers

ry pricing precedents narrowly-as essentially

who purchased minimum percentages of their re

applying only in oligopoly settings or in uncondi

quirements-generally ranging from 60% to 80%

tional price discount circumstances. "Rather than

-from Brunswick. Brunswick eventually tried to

analogizing [bundled discounts] to predatory pric

raise its top tier to 9S%, but faced serious backlash

ing," the court observed, "they are best compared

from the boat manufacturers and discontinued the

with tying, whose foreclosure effects are similar.''7

market share discount program altogether.
Although dealing complex factual records and dif
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

ferent kinds of contingent discounts, LePage's and

rejected the boat builders' claims under Sections 1

Concord Boat offered a stark choice of analogies.

and 2 of the Sherman Act. It found that the market

Would courts and antitrust authorities approach

share discounts did not substantially foreclose

loyalty rebates as disguised instances of predatory

competition, largely based on record evidence

pricing subject to a cost-price test? Or would they

suggesting that boat manufacturers were able

reject predatory pricing analogies and roll loyalty

to switch large percentages of their purchases to

discountanalysis into an analytical framework

alternative suppliers despite the presence of the

similar to the coercion and substantial foreclosure

market share discounts. Significantly, the court

analysis characteristic of exclusive dealing and

also seemed to hold that the market share dis

tying law?

counts would be per se legal if they did not cause
Brunswick's prices to fal I below cost. The court
distinguished cases involving bundled discounting
and seemingly held that the single-product, above
cost loyalty discounts are lawful on the authority of
the U.S. Supreme Court's predatory pricing prece
dents like Brooke Group and Matsushita.6
LePage's involved a market share battle for trans
parent tape between 3M, a manufacturing con
glomerate that sold many different product lines
of consumer products through mass merchant
retailers, and LePage's, a smaller office supplies
manufacturer. 3M dominated the transparent tape
market through its Scotch tape brand with an over

The Rise of the Discount Attribution Test
Concord Boat did not trigger an immediate reaction
in the antitrust community. But LePage's did. The
initial reaction to LePage's was overwhelmingly neg
ative. The Solicitor General of the United States,
Justice Department, and Federal Trade Commis
sion recommended that the Supreme Court deny
certiorari, but were critical of the opinion, opining
that the "court of appeals' failure to identify the
specific factors that made3M's bundled discount
anticompetitive may lead to challenges to pro
competitive programs and prospectively chill the
adoption of such programs."8 The case met with

all share around 90%, but LePage's was the largest
7
8
6

324 F.3d at 155.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, 3M Co. v. LePage's

Brooke Group, Lrd. v. Brown & Williamson, 509 U.S. 209 ( 1993); Matsu

Inc., 540 U.S. 807, cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (May 28, 2004) (No.

shita Elec. Indus. Co.

02- 1865), http//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f203900/203900.pdf

v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 ( 1986).
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extensive scholarly condemnation, including from

tion test began to gain currency with institutions

the highly influential Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise.9

like the Antitrust Modernization Commission,

And in 2007, the bi-partisan Antitrust Moderniza

the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, and

tion Commission issued a report that was harshly

many academics. Its high point arrived in 2008

critical of LePage's for failing to provide any clear

with PeaceHealth, a decision by the U.S. Court of

guidance on when bundled discounts might be

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopting the dis

condemned as anticompetitive and potentially

count attribution test for bundled discounts.12 The

chilling procompetitive bundled discounts.10

PeaceHealth court adopted a test requiring that

At the same time, relatively few commentators

anticompetitive must prove that, when the full

advocated applying an unmodified predatory pric

amount of the discounts given by the defendant is

"a plaintiff who challenges a package discount as

ing rule to bundled discounts-effectively doing

allocated to the competitive product or products,

for bundled discounts what Concord Boat did for

the resulting price of the competitive product or

market share discounts. In the usual common law

products is below the defendant's incremental

fashion, many commentators were persuaded that

cost to produce them."13 As the court observed, "[t]
his requirement ensures that the only bundled
discounts condemned as exclusionary are those
that would exclude an equally efficient producer of
the competitive product or products."14

The LePage's case

Intel: Extending PeaceHealth to Market
Share Discount

was initially

With PeaceHealth instituting a discount attribution

subject to

test for bundled discounts with seemingly fairly
broad acceptance in the antitrust community,

intense criticism

there remained the question of how single-product
market share rebates would be analyzed. Would
the PeaceHealth logic spill over to market share
discounts, or would a pure predatory pricing test,
as suggested by Concord Boat. continue to control?

predatory pricing was the closest analogy, but not
a perfect one. Bundled discounts might exclude

The FTC provided a vague answer in its Decem-

equally efficient competitors even though they

ber 2009 administrative complaint against Intel.

did not result in predatory pricing. An often-cit

Although there were some allegations of bun

ed example involving shampoo and conditioner

dling across multiple product lines, the core of

developed by Janusz Ordover in Ortho Diagnostics,

the Commission's complaint concerned Intel's use

a bundled discount case in the mid-199os, was

of market share discounts to prevent computer

frequently used as an example of how a bundled

OEMs from giving a greater share of their business

discount could exclude an equally efficient com

to Intel's principal rival, ADM. The Commission

petitor and sti11 survive the Brooke Group test for

alleged that Intel's market share discounts resulted

predatory pricing.11

in predatory pricing-"purchases that are effective
ly below cost.''15 The Commission did not explain

The logic of Ortho Diagnostics persuaded many in

how the "effective" price was computed, but it was

the antitrust community that predatory pricing

widely understood to require a similar analysis to

law would need some modification before being

that employed by DC Comp in Provisional Decision

applied to bundled discounts. A discount attribu-

9

3A Phillip E. Areeda

against lntel.16 That approach requires identifying

& Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law P749, at

12 Cascade Heal1h Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (2008)

305-49 (3d ed. 2008)

13 Id. at 909.

10 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOM

14 Id.

15 In re Intel Corp., Complaint, http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/

MENDATIONS 99 (2007) availablea1http:// govinfo.library.unt.edu/
amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pd.
11 Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920

documents/cases/091216intelcmpt.pdf.

F. Supp. 455, 467

16 Comp 37 /990lntel http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/

(SONY 1996)
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a non-contestable segment of the market and re

Judicial decisions concerning conditional pricing

allocating all of the discounts that segment to the

have been mixed. Several courts have dismissed

contestable segment, and then inquiring whether

market share discount cases, finding that the

the resulting price in the contestable segment is

discounts were lawful competition on the merits

below the specified measure of cost. In essence,

that did not threaten competition.20 However,

this is performing the PeaceHealth analysis for sin

other courts have rejected the use of predatory

gle-product loyalty discounts.

pricing rules to address conditional pricing, such as
market share discounts, at least in circumstances

The Intel matter settled without judicial decision,

where the loss of discount could be construed as a

so there was never any indication as to whether the

"penalty" for disloyalty.21

courts would accept this extension of PeaceHealth
to the single-product discount context or continue

Further, some dissent from the use of predatory

to insist on a traditional predatory pricing test as

pricing analogies and discount attribution rules

suggested in Concord Boat. However, plaintiffs be

has arisen from quarters where it might not have

gan to use the "contestable/incontestable" model

been expected. On the milder side, Herbert Hoven

in market share discount cases, on the assump

kamp-a highly influential scholar and custodian

tion that courts would be persuaded to apply the

of the Areeda-Turner treatise-recently posted a

PeaceHealth test in this manner.17 As of the late

draft article pointing out the complexities of dis

years of the last decade, it seemed that the U.S.

count attribution test, particularly in multi-product

antitrust community might be settling into at least

markets where the goods included in the bundle

a tentative agreement on the use of predatory pric

are purchased in varying proportions.22 On the

ing rules-with a discount attribution modifica

stronger side, FTC Com missioner Josh Wright

tion-for all instances of alleged exclusion through

one of the most conservative Commissioners in re

conditional pricing.

cent FTC memory-gave a speech in 4013 in which
he criticized the use of price-cost tests for loyalty

Discount Attribution Called into Question
But a consensus position on the discount attribu
tion test would not be so easily achieved . Events
in the last few years have exposed the wide rifts
that remain in the U.S. antitrust community on the
appropriate treatment of conditional pricing.

discounts and advocated an exclusive dealing
approach instead.23 Standing alone, Commissioner
Wright's comments provide little encouragement
to proponents of more aggressive antitrust policing
of loyalty discounts, sinee Josh has made clear that
he believes proving harm to competition through
exclusive dealing should be a high bar.24 Nonethe

Two events in 2009 underlined the extent to which
broad consensus remained elusive. First, the
Obama Justice Department withdrew the Bush
Administration's report on monopolization, which
had included a proposal to institute the discount
attribution test.18 Second, Harvard Law Professor
Einer Elhauge published an influential article
on tying and bundled discounting that sharply

less, in combination with Professor Hovenkamp's
cautions on the use of the discount attribution test
and decisions like ZF Meritor, the pendulum seems
to have swung somewhat away from the use of
predatory pricing rules (modified or otherwise) in
the last several years.

.

20 E.g. Southeast Missouri Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8'h Cir.
201 O); Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP,

countered the academic criticism of LePage's and
argued against the use of predatory pricing test
for bundled discounts.19 Professor Elhauge has

592 F.3d 991 (2009)
21

ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).

22 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Test for Exclusionary Pricing:
A Critical Journal, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.dm 7abstract_

since authored a number of additional papers on
conditional pricing that argue against predatory
pricing rules.

id=2422120.
23 Joshua D. Wright, Simple but Wrong or Complex but More Accurore7
The Case for on Exclusive Dealing-Based Approach to Evaluating
Loyalty Discounts, Remarks at the Bates White 1 O'h Annual
Conference, June 3,

Antitrust
2013, http://www.ftc.gov/public-state

ments/2013/06/simple-wrong-or-complex-more-accurate-case
17 See, e.g., Eisai Inc v. Sonofi-Aventis U.S., LL(. 2014 WL 1343254

(D.

comments appears at http://cruthonthemarket.com/2013/06/09/

2010)

wright-is-right-and-wright-is-wrong-a-response-to-steve-salop-on

18 Justice Department Withdraws Report on Monopoly Law, http://
wwwjustice.gov /arr/public/press_releases/2009/ 24 5 71O.htm.
19

exclusive-dealing-based. My debate with Steve Sa lop about Josh's

N.J. 2014); In re Imel Microprocessor Litig., 201OW L 8591815 (D. Del.

Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death afthe Single
L. Rev. 397 (2009).

Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv.

loyalty-discounts/.
24 See In re Mc Wone, Inc.. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner
Joshua D. Wright, http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/202211I140206mcwanestatement.pdf.
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The 2014 FTC/DO) Hearings

the future of conditional pricing law in the United

On June 23, 2014, the FTC and Justice Department
jointly convened a day-long workshop to take the
pulse of leading economists and lawyers on the
state of knowledge on the competitive effects on
conditional pricing practices.25 The agencies will
likely release a report on the proceedings at some
point and I will not attempt to summarize them
here, but will provide some informal comments as
a participant.

States. The possibility of the sort of formal, cate
gorical disapproval of loyalty-inducing pricing by
dominant firms reflected in the General Court's
June 12, 2014 decision upholding Intel's liability26
seems remote. Yet a wide range of possibilities,
including at least an exclusive dealing model, pure
predatory pricing rules, or a discount attribution
test remain plausible.
In the short term, there is unlikely to be much

To me, the headline from the day's proceedings
was how far the U.S. antitrust community is from
any sort of consensus on conditional pricing poli
cies. The views expressed by the panelists ranged
from something approaching a presumption of il
legality for loyalty-inducing discounts by dominant
firms to a safe-harbor for discounts that do not
result in below-cost pricing-essentially Concord
Boat without the discount attribution qualification.
The panelists vigorously contested almost every
angle on the topic-whether loyalty discounts
are true economic discounts or simply disguised
disloyalty penalties; whether conditional discounts
can have anticompetitive effects without exclusion
by softening competition and facilitating parallel
supracompetitive pricing; whether conditional
pricing is more similar to predatory pricing or
exclusive dealing; whether prohibiting conditional
pricing would have hydraulic effects toward more
anticompetitive practices such as pure exclusive
dealing or vertical integration; whether there are
efficiencies attributable to conditional pricing that
could not be captured through more competitively
benign practices. These, and many other angles,
were sharply contested.

relief from the uncertainty. The Supreme Court
is the only institution practically able to provide a
conclusive answer, but it is unlikely to take a major
step on conditional pricing until the dust settles. In
technical areas like antitrust, the Court often waits
for the formation of professional consensus in the
relevant field before announcing broad rules. It
has rejected a number of petitions for certiorari
in conditional pricing cases, probably because the
issue was not yet sufficiently crystallized in lower
court opinions and expert opinion. Recent events
will give the Court little encouragement to act any
time soon.
The longer run depends, of course, upon the com
position of the Court, the possibility of consensus
developing among the antitrust agencies and
leading academics, and continuing developments
in the lower courts. If anything is predictive, it is
the Court's long-term trajectory since the 1980s
towards protecting unilateral pricing decision from
attack unless the pricing is predatory. In upholding
the jury's verdict finding liability for loyalty dis
counting, the ZF Meritor nonetheless court recog
nized that the force of its earli.er LePage's opinion
had "been undermined by intervening Supreme

It remains to be seen what the agencies make of
the workshop and how they use it rhetorically to
justify any directions they may seek to pursue.
One point that seems clear is that they would have
a difficult time claiming the existence of broad
consensus on almost any important facet of the
current debate. The use of modified predatory

Court precedent,"27 including cases like Weyerhaus
er28 on predatory overbidding and /i11kLi11e29 on
price squeeze. If the Supreme Court stays on its
current course, when it finally rules, it will do so in
a way that provides event dominant firms a good
bit of latitude in offering conditional or loyalty-in
ducing prices.

pricing rules, once the seemingly anointed course,
is now merely one proposal for discussion.
26 Imel Corp., Case T-286/09, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea 7d0fl 30dea92cbe 7 3 781 74eb

Looking Forward

d905893ea636 1f8e2.e 34Kaxilc3eQc40LaxqMbN40bhePe0?

We end 2014 with considerable uncertainty about

text=&docid= l 5354 3&pagel ndex=O&docla ng=EN&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=fi rst&part= 1 &cid=256025.
27 696 F.3d at 273 n. 11.

25 See http)/www.ftc.gov/news-events/evems-calendar /2014/06/
con ditional-pricing-practices-economic-analysis-legal-policy.
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28 We yerhaeuser Co. v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. 549 U.S.
312 (2007)
29 Poe. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc, 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
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Finally, a word of strategic advice for those wishing
to shape the terms of this debate. For better or for
worse, the U.S. debate over the legal treatment of
conditional pricing remains driven by the common
law's obsession with analogy. Although econo
mists often c;:hafe at the imperfection and over-and
under-inclusion of analogies to existing practices,
that is the way the courts tend to see the issue. In

For better or worse,
the U.S. debate over
conditional pricing
remains driven by the
common law's
obsession with analogy

my opinion, one of the most useful presentations
at the FTC/DOJ hearings was Michael Waldman
and Michael Whinston's analysis of the claims that
the Supreme Court has made about the attributes
of price discounting that justify conservative struc
turing of predatory pricing law and an inquiry into
whether conditional pricing practices share those
attributes.30 Professors Waldman and Whinston
identified six such attributes and suggested that
conditional discounts do not share the majority of
them.31 While I disagree with some of their conclu
sions, this approach is the kind that allows econo
mists to speak influentially to courts on these sorts
of challenging questions of economic policy. In my
view, future contestation over legal treatment of
conditional pricing practices will continue to play
in the shadows of the known categories, particular
ly predatory pricing, tying, and exclusive dealing.

30 Michael Waldman & Michael Whinston, An Overview of Condirional

Pricing Pracrices, http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/pub
lic_events/302251/waldma n-whinston.pdf
31

Id. ("Need to reduce frivolous litigation;""Firms need to have a
bright line;""Firms rarely have reasons to price below MC, and its
hard to identify above-MC predation (akin to price regulation);"
"When P>MC. forcing a higher price sacrifices short-run efficiency
for speculative long-run gain;""lf P>MC. an 'equally efficient com
petitor' can make sales;""lf P>MC, a firm whose presence is efficient
can make sales:').
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